By W. Cook — Mental Root Kit Series
Every generation sees its beliefs as the pinnacle of reason and its causes as self-evidently just.
But there’s a quiet hypocrisy hidden in how we speak of ideas that spread:
when we approve of them, we call it progress —
when we disapprove, we call it contagion.
This is the asymmetry of moral language.
It’s the reflex to praise movements we identify with as “awakenings” while dismissing those we oppose as “mass delusion.”
In doing so, we reveal not superior reasoning but selective humility — a willingness to question others’ convictions but not our own.
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I. Contagion as Mirror, Not Weapon
The French social theorist Gustave Le Bon (1895) first observed that emotion and imitation can sweep through crowds with the force of a fever.
Later, René Girard (1972) deepened that insight, describing how mimetic desire — the human urge to imitate not only behavior but longing itself — can bind or destroy communities.
Their lesson still stands: contagion describes the spread of passion, not its purity.
The same psychological mechanism that carried abolition and civil rights can also power hysteria or fear.
Social contagion is morally neutral; it tells us how conviction travels, not whether it should.
The danger lies in using the concept as a weapon of condescension rather than a mirror of vulnerability.
We call others brainwashed so we can feel enlightened —
but moral immunity is the most contagious delusion of all.
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II. The Bias of Justified Virtue
As Nietzsche warned in On the Genealogy of Morals, much of what we call virtue is simply resentment in disguise —
a moral story told to flatter the teller.
Modern psychology confirms it: Jonathan Haidt (2012) showed that moral judgments are often intuitive and emotional first, rationalized afterward.
We feel our way to conclusions and then dress them in reason.
When we label opposing views as “contagion,” we may only be disguising emotional defensiveness as intellectual critique.
This is the quiet return of lazy egotistical morality: virtue used for self-validation rather than self-examination.
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III. The Contagion Test
To remain honest, every thinker should apply what might be called The Contagion Test, echoing Karl Popper’s demand that every theory remain falsifiable — even one’s own:
If I only see irrational spread in the ideas I dislike, I’m practicing moral favoritism, not analysis.
If I can spot the same mechanics in the movements I admire, I’m practicing philosophy.
This rule keeps analysis from collapsing into propaganda.
It reminds us, as John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty, that our grasp of truth depends on engaging the dissent we find uncomfortable.
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IV. The Paradox of Moral Progress
Many awakenings begin as contagions.
Empathy spreads just as efficiently as outrage.
The work of Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler (2009) demonstrates that behaviors, moods, and even compassion can ripple through social networks much like viruses.
Yet, without the stabilizing discipline of reflection, even noble contagions curdle into dogma.
The goal isn’t to halt the spread of ideas but to ensure that wisdom travels faster than self-righteousness.
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V. Why It Matters
When we use contagion language selectively, we grant ourselves moral exemption —
the illusion that our values are immune to the same psychological currents that sway everyone else.
As Daniel Kahneman (2011) showed, certainty feels faster and safer than doubt, but it blinds us to our own cognitive shortcuts.
True moral competence begins when we admit:
“I am just as capable of illusion as those I critique.”
That humility is not weakness; it’s the firewall of reason.
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📚 Selected References
(APA 7th Edition)
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2009). Connected: The surprising power of our social networks and how they shape our lives. Little, Brown and Company.
Girard, R. (1972). Violence and the sacred. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Pantheon Books.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Le Bon, G. (1895). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. T. Fisher Unwin.
Mill, J. S. (1859). On liberty. John W. Parker and Son.
Nietzsche, F. (1887). On the genealogy of morals. Vintage.
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.
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